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Among our two most basic physical theories quantum mechanics enjoys a special status, thanks to its
distinctive and counterintuitive characteristics such as ‘potentiality’, ‘entanglement’ and ‘non-locality’. To
be sure, general relativity is its worthy rival in beauty, internal coherence and unprecedented empirical
precision, but in its ability to arouse acrimonious debates over a possible interpretation of its formalism
quantum theory stands second to none. There is, of course, no disagreement over the set of rules embedded
in the quantum formalism for predicting experimental outcomes. But these rules are disconcertingly silent
on how one should picture the underlying quantum reality. And when an attempt is made to provide such
a picture, one is faced with some curious and fascinating metaphysical dilemmas never before encountered
in the history of physics. The nineteen essays in Potentiality, Entanglement and Passion-at-a-Distance –
a Festschrift dedicated to Abner Shimony, who is renowned for his pioneering contributions to the subject
– cover a wide range of issues related to these dilemmas. The contributions – almost all of which are by
eminent workers in the field – are not intended for the uninitiated, and require sophistication in physics well
beyond the undergraduate level.
The neo-Aristotelian notion of quantum-mechanical potentiality as a novel metaphysical modality of
nature – situated between mere logical possibility and bona fide actuality – was favoured by Heisenberg, and
has been exuberantly endorsed by Shimony (1978, 1998). According to this notion, the quantum-mechanical
statevector represents a network of potentialities governed by the well-known linear Schro¨dinger dynamics. A
potentiality for a physical property is far more than a mere (objective) indefiniteness of that property, since
it also includes further structure such as non-classical correlations between quantum constituents (Shimony
1998). By contrast, actuality – ‘emerging’ ontologically via a controlled or uncontrolled ‘act of measurement’
– embodies definiteness, resulting from a loss of quantum correlations. In terms of these notions, the
quantum-mechanical measurement problem is simply an acute problem of unequivocally understanding the
phenomenologically prolific transitions from potentialities to actualities – i.e., understanding the ubiquitous
transitions between these two completely distinct metaphysical modalities.
If potentialities are as real as actualities, then can one observe a network of such potentialities? In more
familiar terms: Is the quantum state observable? This is the question asked in two of the contributions to the
Festschrift. Aharonov and Vaidman pose this question very differently from Busch. They introduce a variant
of the notion of ‘protective measurement’ (previously introduced by them in collaboration with Anandan)
to ‘observe’ the quantum state of a single system, and generalize it to Aharonov’s two-vector formulation
of quantum mechanics. Busch, on the other hand, explores the issue within the general representation of
observables as positive operator valued measures, and concludes that “the quantum state is not an observable
[in the usual quantum-mechanical sense], but [nevertheless] not unobservable”.
† To appear in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics (1999).
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One of the most profound manifestations of potentiality is, of course, quantum entanglement, which
entails that the quantum-mechanical ‘whole’ is profusely and quantitatively more than simply ‘the sum
of its parts’. Since not all quantum-mechanical states are entangled states (some being product states),
an immediate question that arises about a given quantum state is whether or not it is entangled. More
precisely: “Is it algorithmically decidable whether a given quantum-mechanical state is entangled or not?”
And “if not, can we effectively decide whether or not a state is within [a given Hilbert-space distance] ε of
a product state?” Amusingly enough, as Myrvold reports in his contribution to the Festschrift, the first of
these two “decision problem[s] for entanglement” was posed to Shimony by Aspect in a dream! The second
problem was subsequently posed by Shimony (fully conscious!) to Myrvold, who in his contribution reaches
the conclusion that the question “Is there a product state within [a given Hilbert-space distance] ε of ψ?”
is almost decidable, but not quite. That is to say, for a given Hilbert-space vector ψ and a real number ε,
there is an algorithmic procedure that gives an affirmative answer to this question if there happens to be a
product state (say χ) less than a distance ε away from ψ (i.e., if ||ψ − χ|| < ε), and a negative answer if all
product states are further than the distance ε from ψ. However, not surprisingly (not, that is, to an expert
in orthodox computability theory), the algorithm fails to terminate if the distance of the nearest product
state from ψ is exactly equal to ε. In other words, the question whether ψ is precisely a product state (i.e.,
whether ||ψ − χ|| = ε = 0) is effectively undecidable!
In addition to this analysis by Myrvold, about a third of the contributions in the Festschrift are devoted
to quantum entanglement and its implication of ‘non-locality’. Since the non-locality harboured within
quantum entanglement seems devoid of any ‘action-at-a-distance’ (it does not lead to sending a ‘signal’ faster
than light), Shimony has humourously used the expression ‘passion-at-a-distance’ to describe it: hence the
appearance of this locution in the title of the Festschrift. At times, borrowing a political aphorism, Shimony
has also referred to this curious state of affairs as ‘peaceful coexistence’ between quantum non-locality and
the causal requirements of special relativity. There are some remarkable contributions in the Festschrift
which examine this issue of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Particularly noteworthy is the analysis by Popescu and
Rohrlich, who, following Shimony, raise one of the most daring questions of all: “Why is quantum mechanics
what it is?” In particular: Is it possible for non-locality and causality to peacefully coexist in any other
theory besides quantum mechanics? Curiously enough, by constructing some explicit models, Popescu and
Rohrlich demonstrate that quantum mechanics is not the only theory that is hospitable to both non-locality
and causality; although quantum-mechanical non-locality is certainly different in character from any non-
locality that could be accommodated in the general framework of classical physics.
Of course, the historical roots of quantum non-locality can be traced back (at least) to the pioneering
argument put forward by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) in 1935. It is then somewhat surprising,
considering the purported threat of action-at-a-distance central to this argument, that so little attention is
given to its special-relativistic reformulation. One reason for this neglect is perhaps the difficulties involved
in translating the argument into a relativistic context. In their contribution to the Festschrift, Redhead
and La Rivie`re discuss the problematics of such a translation, paying particular attention to the need for a
relativistic modification of the reality criterion of EPR. They note that precisely in this reality criterion a
blatantly nonrelativistic assumption of absolute time ordering among the measurement events occurring in
the two branches of an entangled system enters the EPR argument, necessitating a modified criterion for
the relativistic systems. One such relativistic reality criterion for the attribution of elements of reality that
is not contingent on the time ordering of the actualizations of potentialities has been previously proposed
by Ghirardi and Grassi. However, Redhead and La Rivie`re argue that the Ghirardi-Grassi criterion is
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flawed by an ambiguously stated locality principle and an assumption of determinism hidden in the use of
counterfactuals, undermining their claimed peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics and special
relativity. Elsewhere in the Festschrift Ghirardi provides a vigorous defence for the Ghirardi-Grassi criterion
against these charges by Redhead and La Rivie`re. Judging from this stimulating exchange it appears,
however, that a satisfactory relativistic formulation of the EPR argument is still very much an open question.
Returning to the notion of quantum-mechanical potentiality, it is worth noting that the notion not only
lends metaphysical clarity to quantum mechanics, but also allows a convenient classification of different
(realist) approaches to the interpretational problems infesting the theory (Shimony 1998). These approaches
fall roughly into three broad categories, which – divulging my own order of preference on the matter – I
propose to call: (1) regressive approaches, (2) fallacious approaches, and (3) progressive approaches.
The first among these downplay the metaphysical innovations brought about by quantum mechanics; in
particular, they downplay the concepts of indefiniteness and potentiality by attempting to reduce them – by
hook or by crook – to mere reflections of ignorance. A prime example of such a regressive approach which
tries to undermine the conceptual revolutions brought about by quantum theory is the ‘hidden variables’
programme (including the de Broglie-Bohm theory). It remains to be seen whether any such counterrevo-
lutionary approach is eventually successful in reducing quantum mechanics (especially relativistic quantum
field theory) to a mere glorified version of (classical) statistical mechanics.
The second category of approaches – to their credit – embrace potentialities wholeheartedly, but deny
actualizations of these potentialities. They acknowledge appearances of such actualizations, but view these
appearances as purely phenomenological aspects of the world. The examples here are ‘the many-worlds in-
terpretation’ of quantum mechanics and various decoherence theories. Such an approach takes the formalism
of quantum theory too seriously, prematurely extrapolating it to all physical scales (from microscopic to cos-
mological), and thereby commits – as Whitehead would have put it – ‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness’.
Indeed, in the light of the extraordinary specialness of Planck-scale physics*, the a priori extrapolation by
some seventeen orders of magnitude (e.g., in the mass scale) required by these approaches to maintain the
universality of the quantum formalism can hardly be viewed as rational.
Finally, the third category of approaches, which actually go beyond the confining formalism of quantum
mechanics (e.g., a Pearle-GRW-type theory), not only recognizes the metaphysical innovations brought about
by quantum mechanics, such as potentialities, but also takes the proliferation of actualities in the world to
be more than a mere phenomenological experience. That is, these approaches put actuality on a par with
potentiality, and take both to be equally genuine ontological attributes of the world. Unfortunately, although
they make some headway towards explaining the process of the actualization of potentialities (but see below),
as yet there is no empirical support for these innovative approaches. Furthermore, they face immense
theoretical and conceptual difficulties. Nevertheless, since a reconciliation between quantum mechanics and
general relativity – the other (often unfairly neglected) pillar of 20th century physics – is as yet beyond the
* The Planck scale is indeed quite dramatically more special compared to any other better-understood scale in
physics, since, near it (e.g., near the big bang or a black hole), some evenhanded interplay between the fundamental
tenets of quantum mechanics and general relativity is undoubtedly taking place. What is more, understanding this
interplay would almost certainly necessitate some radically unorthodox ideas, since the non-dynamical spacetime
structure axiomatic to quantum theories is utterly anathematic to the very essence of general relativity, with its
dynamical picture of spacetime. In the light of these facts, and because the conventional distinction between
‘microscopic’ and ‘macroscopic’ ceases to be meaningful near the Planck scale, it is rather presumptuous – if
not naive – to maintain that only general relativity breaks down near this unique physical scale while quantum
mechanics escapes it unscathed. For further discussion on these and related issues see (Christian 1998).
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horizon, and such a reconciliation will almost certainly bring about a major revolution in notions as basic
as causality and time, the proponents of this third category are more than justified in looking beyond the
straitjacket of orthodox quantum theory. Indeed, the problem of the actualization of potentialities is best
viewed not merely as a problem to be solved within the framework of quantum mechanics, but rather as a
glorious opportunity to go beyond the confines of quantum theory in order to comply with the ineluctable
demands of general relativity.
In this Volume Two of the Festschrift, there are no articles adhering to a regressive approach belonging to
category (1) above; there are a few in Volume One, however. The category (2) of fallacious approaches fares
better in this respect, in that there are several articles in this category; although there is no explicit adherent
of ‘many-worlds’ in these articles. Refreshingly enough, however, there is at least one essay – that by Ghirardi
and Weber – which explicitly advocates going beyond the bounds of quantum mechanics, a` la the Pearle-
GRW programme, and hence belongs to the category (3) of progressive approaches. Going beyond quantum
mechanics is, of course, easier said than done, and the task Ghirardi and Weber set out to accomplish is
far from trivial. In the Pearle-GRW programme we are asked to accept an ad hoc assumption: “besides
the standard [quantum-mechanical] evolution, physical systems are subjected to spontaneous localizations
occurring at random times and affecting their elementary constituents.” If this assumption is accepted
without reservations, then we are promised the much wanted ‘holy grail’: a universal dynamics which
remains valid for both micro and macro systems, is conducive to an ‘individual interpretation’ for these
systems, and – most importantly – provides an “account for the emergence, at the appropriate level, of
definite properties of individual physical systems”. Remarkably enough, as is now well-known, the Pearle-
GRW programme does succeed in achieving the first part of this goal. Unfortunately, however, due to the
infamous ‘tail problem’, the attempt miserably fails when it comes to providing a convincing account for the
ontic emergence of definite properties.
Ghirardi and Weber mount a desperate but – at least in my view – ultimately unsuccessful attempt (as
does Pearle differently in Volume One) to convince us that the ‘tail problem’ is not really a problem at all,
if the Pearle-GRW model is interpreted ‘correctly’. The issue is really quite simple: their unified dynamics
reduces all superposed states of a sufficiently macroscopic body, such as α |here〉 + β |there〉, to almost
disjoint states – either |here〉 or |there〉, but not quite, because the unwanted complex coefficient of such a
superposition, say β, is – albeit extremely small (β <<< α) – never exactly zero, leaving a small but infinite
‘tail’ in the wrong part of the wavefunction. Although this is good enough ‘for all practical purposes’ (which
is what the Ghirardi-Weber attempt of reinterpretation boils down to), from the metaphysical perspective
the ‘tail’ is disastrous. For, clearly, as long as the ‘tail’ remains in either explicit or implicit form, a Pearle-
GRW-type approach makes not an iota of improvement over the standard quantum measurement theory with
respect to the metaphysical problem of the actualization of potentialities. Since no amount of reinterpretation
of Pearle-GRW formalism can make the unwanted coefficients vanish, the efforts of Pearle in Volume One
and that of Ghirardi and Weber in the present volume are distressingly futile, leaving Schro¨dinger’s Cat to
remain as haunting as ever!
The ‘tails’ in the Pearle-GRW programme are but a symptom of a much deeper problem. Let us not forget
that these models begin with an ad hoc assumption of ‘spontaneous localizations occurring at random times’.
This assumption is purely phenomenologically motivated, and the authors offer little physical underpinning –
if any – for this awkward process. To be sure, one comes across some quasi-physical notions in the literature
such as ‘quantum fluctuations of spacetime’ offered as a physical reason behind the assumption, but in the
absence of a consistent quantum theory of gravity such ill-understood (if not entirely meaningless) notions do
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little to comfort one’s unease with the crudeness of the process. Clearly, a more honest approach would be to
view the ‘tail problem’ as symptomatic of a much deeper physical problem – that of understanding the actual
physics underlying the mechanism of quantum state reduction. In this context, the Pearle-GRW approach
should be contrasted with the (slightly) related proposal by Penrose (1996, Christian 1998), who at least
identifies the fundamental physical culprit, the raison d’eˆtre for state reduction – namely the irreconcilable
conflict between principles of superposition and general covariance, albeit as yet without a detailed theory.
That gravity should be responsible for quantum state reduction is an intriguing proposition, gaining
strength from the fact that all attempts to reconcile gravity with the quantum formalism have failed. There
are two contributions in the Festschrift which touch upon some of the acute issues faced by any attempt
to ‘unify’ general relativity and quantum mechanics. In a thought provoking essay, Anandan highlights a
parallel between Einstein’s efforts to create a relativistic theory of gravity and the task we face of creating
a ‘quantum theory of gravity’. Drawing lessons from this observation, he proposes quantum versions of the
principles of equivalence and general covariance. Howard, on the other hand, after distinguishing between
the two possible senses of non-locality discussed above, notices that, unlike the ‘peaceful coexistence’ (a` la
Shimony) between the quantum-mechanical non-locality and the causal requirements of special relativity,
there is no peaceful coexistence between the event-ontologies of general relativity and quantum mechanics,
and sketches a programme for ‘quantum gravity’ which could put the two theories in ontological harmony.
However, he seems to be completely oblivious of Penrose’s twistor programme for ‘quantum gravity’ (now
well in its thirties), which is not only conceptually and mathematically far more sophisticated than Howard’s
embryonic suggestion, but also – since ‘non-locality’ is an intrinsic feature of the twistor space – goes a long
way towards making ‘peace’ between the two ontologies.
Out of the nineteen contributions in the Festschrift, I have discussed but a handful, and even those only
impressionistically. There is a lot to choose from. In particular, there are contributions from some of the
most eminent workers in the field such as d’Espagnat, Hardy, Mermin, Mittelstaedt, Peres, Primas, Rimini,
Stachel, and Stein, and it is impossible to do justice to their varied viewpoints in this limited space. Although
some of the articles in the Festschrift are quite demanding – and at times rather trite – I highly recommend
the collection as providing much food for thoughts on quantum dilemmas.
Finally, at the end of the Festschrift we are given a bibliography of Shimony’s publications starting
from 1947. The length of this bibliography is impressive enough, but what is even more impressive is the
uncanny versatility of Shimony’s scholarly mind. For instance, in addition to his enviable contributions in
pure philosophy, philosophy of physics, theoretical physics, and experimental physics, we come across his
work on philosophy of biology, sociology, several collections of his metaphysical poems and plays, and even
a delightful little children’s book!
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